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Abstrak: Presiden Non-Muslim di Negara Muslim: Diskursus Politik Islam dalam Konteks Politik Indonesia 
Kontemporer. Artikel ini secara spesifik dimaksudkan untuk membahas secara kritis pendapat  para cendekiawan 
Muslim Indonesia  tentang  kemungkinan non-Muslim menjadi presiden di Negara Republik Indonesia yang 
merupakan negara  berpenduduk  Muslim  terbesar  di dunia. Hingga  detik  ini, wacana  Islam klasik tentang masalah 
ini cenderung terjebak dalam model analisis  normatif  yang  terkesan  rigid  dan  tidak toleran. Wacana ini, sampai batas 
tertentu,  kurang dapat menghargai kondisi  sosial, budaya, sejarah, dan  kompleksitas politik  masyarakat  Muslim. 
Oleh karena itu, diskursus klasik mengenai masalah ini oleh banyak cendekiawan Indonesia kontemporer dipandang 
telah  gagal merespons  dinamika sosial-politik  saat ini,  terutama  bila dilihat dari  sudut  pandang multi-kulturalisme 
dan demokrasi. Artikel ini membahas  dimensi penting  mengenai kepemimpinan non-Muslim di Indonesia yang 
sering  dilupakan  atau  sangat jarang didiskusikan. 
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Abstract: A Non-Muslim President in a Muslim State: Islamic Political Discourse in Contemporary Indonesia. 
This article charts the political discourse amongst Islamic leaders regarding the possibility of a non-Muslim becoming 
President in Indonesia, the world’s most populated Muslim state, an important issue but one that is only seldom 
discussed in an academic context. Until recently, classical Islamic discourse on this issue, which has generally rejected 
this possibility, had tended to be trapped in a normative model of analysis which today seems intolerant and rigid. This 
article contends that this discourse, to some extent, does not properly appreciate the complex social, cultural, historical 
and political realities of the Muslim community today. Indeed, many other contemporary scholars view this mode of 
discourse as failing to respond to the current social-political dynamic, especially those scholars coming at it from a 
multicultural democratic perspective. Perhaps most importantly, the legal reality—even though there is a reasonable 
degree of controversy surrounding it—which is that there is no criterion that the President has to be Muslim, is also 
rejected by this discourse.
Keywords: Islam in Indonesia, Non-Muslim President, God’s Authority, Jakarta Charter.
Introduction 
This article discusses the possibility of a Non-Muslim 
becoming President in Indonesia. From a theological 
point of view, this is a difficult issue because both the 
Qur’an and Sunnah, the two main sources of Islamic 
Law, contain both arguments that forbid Muslims from 
choosing Non-Muslim leaders and arguments that allow 
it. In aiming to determine whether or not being led my 
a non-Muslim President is permissible for Muslims, 
Islamic scholars have interpreted this contradictory 
information in a variety of ways.
At the moment, there is still skepticism regarding 
the possibility of a non-Muslim President conceptually, 
and discomfort of the prospect in practice. This is no 
wonder, as the regulations regarding this matter in 
Muslim majority countries are different to those in 
other countries. Most Muslim majority countries, 
including Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Iran, Jordan and Malaysia, all apply 
regulations that the President or the head of state of the 
country must be a Muslim. Up until now, there have 
only been three Muslim majority countries that have 
been led by non-Muslim Presidents: Senegal, Nigeria 
and Lebanon. Although roughly 94% of its population 
is Muslim, from 1980 to 1988 Senegal was led by a 
Catholic President, Leopold Sedar Senghor. Nigeria, 
whose population also has more Muslims than it has 
Christians, saw Olusegun Obasanjo, who is Christian, 
serving as President of the country not just once but 
for three terms: 1976 to 1979, 1999 to 2004, and most Received: 23rd January 2012, Revised: 16th May 2012, Accepted: 
30th May 2012.
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recently from 2004 to 2007.
The most striking example, however, is Lebanon. 
In spite of an estimated 64% of its population being 
Muslim, Lebanon has been led by Christian Presidents 
since 1943. The reason for this is fairly simple; it 
has to do with al-Mitsâq al-Wathanî, the national 
pact established that year that says that the Lebanese 
President must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime 
Minister must be a Sunni Muslim, the House speaker 
must be a Shiite Muslim, the Defense Minister must be 
Druze Muslim, and the Foreign Affairs Minister must 
be Greece Orthodox Christian. This pact has been in 
effect and adhered to since 1943, so during this time 
the Lebanese President has never not been a Maronite 
Christian.
Contemporary opinion amongst Muslims, either in 
Indonesia or in other Muslim majority countries which 
still oppose non-Muslim Presidents, is in line with and 
influenced by a classical concept: that a country should 
be based on Islamic theology. In classical Sunni literature 
this country concept is called a caliphate, the head of 
state of which, the caliph, has two main tasks: firstly 
to maintain religion and secondly to manage the world 
(hirâsah al-dîn wa siyâsah al-dun-yâ). In other words, the 
caliph is the one who holds power not only in religious 
matters, but also in political matters, where he has 
executive, legislative, and judicative powers. In terms of 
religion, he operates, amongst other things, as an imâm 
when performing mass prayers, as a leader of pilgrimage 
(Amîr al-Hajj), and as a preacher of sermon at mosque, 
either during Friday, îd al- Fithr or îd al-Adhâ prayers. 
However, while the social-political conditions now are 
far different to those of the classical era, it is the latter 
upon which contemporary opinion among Muslims 
about non-Muslim Presidency is based, even though 
such an era no longer reflects the current social-political 
situation. Therefore, if this opinion were to be based 
on a contemporary context, rather than a classical one, 
the question of whether or not a non-Muslim should 
be allowed to be able to become their President can be 
reconsidered.
The Rules about Non-Muslim Presidency in 
Indonesia
Since August 18, 1945, the requirement that the 
Indonesian President be Muslim has never actually 
been in place. Constitutionally speaking, non-Muslim 
citizens in Indonesia have the same political right to 
becoming President as Muslim citizens. However, 
following the issuing of the Presidential Decree on July 
5, 1959, the issue of whether or not a non-Muslim 
could become the President has been the subject of 
bitter debate amongst politicians and Islamic leaders.
Historically in Indonesia there have been two groups 
contesting this debate. The first group believes the 
Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959 can be read as saying 
that only Muslims can become Indonesian President, 
and that this Decree automatically prevails. The second 
group disagrees that this true and therefore believe that 
non-Muslims are entitled to become President also. 
Sociologically, the amount of Indonesian Muslims, 
who in total represent roughly 88% of the country (as of 
2009), unwilling to vote for a non-Muslim Presidential 
candidate suggests that the country as whole is not 
willing to be led by non-Muslim President. Among 
other reasons, this is because the majority of Muslims, 
as reflected by the views of Nahdlatul Ulama (the 
largest Muslim Organization in Indonesia) for example, 
consider the Indonesian President to be the highest 
ruler or administrator in three areas: administration 
(hinge kang sinuhun), military command (senopati hing 
ngalaga), and religious affairs (sayidin panatagama). 
Since these tasks correspond to those of the caliph, and 
the majority of contemporary Muslim opinion about 
Presidency is based on the caliphate, and obviously the 
caliph has to be Muslim, most Muslims believe that the 
Indonesian President and his vice President must also 
be Muslim. If not, their administration is considered 
illegitimate. As a consequence, the high ranking officials 
they appoint, including the penghulu (the officer in 
charge of recording marriage), are also considered to be 
illegitimate. If the penghulu is illegitimate, then so too is 
the marital status of a bride and bridegroom which the 
penghulu is involved in recording. Thus, if the religion 
of the Indonesian president were to be anything other 
than Muslim, the implications for Indonesian Muslims 
could be profound.
Based on the above reasoning, during the Dutch 
Colonial era Muslims did not want get married through 
the penghulu because it was the Dutch government—a 
non-Muslim administrator—who appointed him, 
making him illegitimate and thus unqualified to handle 
Muslim marital affairs. To resolve this issue, Muslims 
just appointed a person they trusted to be the wali 
hakim, the person who acts on behalf of the father of 
the bride to record the marriage.
In the Old Order regime, some Muslims did not only 
reject the notion of a non-Muslim President, but also 
that of a Muslim President who did not study in Islamic 
traditional schools (santri) and had not performed 
pilgrimage. Sukarno, Indonesia’s first President, who 
was not educated in a traditional Islamic school, was 
considered by some Indonesian Muslims to therefore 
lack the required level of competence needed for the 
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Presidency. To cover up this deficiency, a conference of 
Islamic scholars in Cipanas held on March 2-7, 1954, 
decided to give qualify Bung Karno’s authority with the 
title of Walî al-Amr Dharûrî bi al-syawkah—emergency 
government administrator. Six years later, the title was 
re-inaugurated in Decision No.27 at the Nahdlatul 
Ulama Conference in Surabaya held on September 
8-13, 1954. 
At this conference, the title given to Bung Karno 
was formerly “Walî al-Amr Dharûrî dzû Syawkah”. 
Besides bestowing the title, the Cipanas conference also 
decided that the tauliyah authority of anyone appointed 
by the President, including the authority of wali hakim, 
which according to tradition in some places should be 
appointed by Ahl al-Hall wa al’-aqd, was valid. But the 
term “dzû syawkah” in the title was later corrected by 
Inyi’ Candung, former Chairman of Central Sumatra 
Province’s Islamic Law Court, to become “bissyawkah”. 
According to him, this was because in all fiqh books, 
the meaning of the term “dzu syaukah” was always 
associated with “sulthân kâfirûn”, the unbeliever sultan. 
Although Sukarno did not study in a traditional Islamic 
school, he was still a Muslim, not an unbeliever, hence 
the decision to correct the title.
After Sukarno performed pilgrimage and instructed 
to build the Baiturrahim mosque at the Merdeka 
Palace, the Islamic scholars at the State Islamic Institute 
(IAIN—now UIN) deemed it time to omit the term 
“Dharûrî bi al-syawkah” from Sukarno’s title, changing 
it to just “Walî al-Amri”. This title Walî al-Amri was 
then made official by MPRS (Provisional People’s 
Consultative Assembly) through MPRS decision No. 
III/MPRS/1963 during the second MPRS General 
Session held in Bandung on May 15-21, 1963.
Discourse about whether or not non-Muslims 
should be able to become President formally began 
during the writing of Indonesian constitution in 1945, 
the second session of BPUPKI (Dokuritsu Zyunbi 
Tyosakai—a Japanese-organized committee for granting 
independence to Indonesia) held on July 10-16, 1945. 
During this session, both nationalist and Islamic groups 
agreed to a consensus that in the future Indonesia’s 
freedom would be based on the basic principle of 
“Deity with an obligation to perform Islamic laws for 
its adherents”. In addition, they also accepted Islam as 
the state religion, and that the Indonesian President 
must be a Muslim. What is more, they also accepted all 
Islamic sentences written both in the preamble and the 
body of 1945 Constitution bills.
It should be noted, however, that it seemed the 
consensus was not built on strong foundations. 
On August 18, 1945, one day after the Indonesian 
independence was proclaimed, this consensus was 
discussed again, with members of the Indonesian 
Independence Preparation Committee (PPKI), which 
had been established on August 7, 1945, chaired by 
Sukarno, held a meeting to review the consensus with 
an agenda of discussing some important amendments 
in the Preamble and the Constitution. 
During the meeting, deputy chairman of PPKI 
Mohammad Hatta, extended four proposals for 
amendment as follows: (1) The word “Mukaddimah” 
was replaced by “Pembukaan”; (2) In the Preamble to 
the Constitutionm, a subordinate sentence, “Based on 
the Deity, with obligation to perform Islamic laws for 
its adherents” was replaced by “Based on a belief in the 
One and Only God”; (3) In Article 6 clause (1), “The 
President is a native Indonesian and Muslim,” the words 
“and Muslim” were omitted; (4) Along with the second 
amendment above, Article 29 clause (1) became “The 
State is based on a belief of the one and only God”, to 
replace “The State is based on the Deity and obligation 
to perform Islamic laws for its adherents”.
The rationale of Hatta’s decision to put forward 
these proposals was that they would serve to unite all 
Indonesians. The story goes that the advice of a young 
Kaigun (Japanese Navy) officer, whose name is forgotten, 
especially influenced this decision. His message was 
that unless some of the Islamic elements on the Jakarta 
Charter—such as the obligation to perform Islamic law 
for its adherents, Islam as the state official religion and 
the requirement that Indonesian President must be a 
Muslim—were amended, the Protestant and Catholic 
adherents, many of whom lived in the eastern part of 
Indonesia, would establish a new state.
So after holding that meeting for a few hours that 
afternoon, the PPKI agreed unanimously to introduce 
the amendments proposed by Hatta at the opening of 
the session into the Preamble and the Constitution. 
What is now widely known as the 1945 Constitution 
today includes these four aforementioned amendments. 
However, the hurried approval on some very important 
and divisive amendments triggered what General 
Chairman of the Masymi Islamic Party Prawoto 
Mangkusasmito called a “historische vraag”—a “history 
question”—where one’s point of view on the legitimacy 
of these amendments, and thus the Constitution, 
depends on whose version of history one thinks is true. 
One version belongs to Endang Saifuddin Anshari, who 
notes that, of the nine people signing the Jakarta Charter 
the day before, only three people—Soekarno, Hatta, 
and Soebardjo—all secular Muslim nationalists, were 
involved in the amendment process of the preamble and 
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the body of Constitutions on August 18, 1945.1 This 
meant that there wasn’t a single Islamic nationalist who 
was involved in that amendment process. Therefore, 
if this is true, it is fair to say that in making these 
amendments independent of the six other signatories 
of the Jakarta Charter, the national group reneged on 
the compromise that had been reached with the Islamic 
group just a short time before. Believing this to be true, 
Islamic nationalists were left feeling as though they had 
been betrayed.
Another version, different to Anshari, belongs to 
Bahtiar Effendy, who notes that Hatta’s proposals 
already had the backing of four Islamic figures, namely 
Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Wahid Hasjim, Kasman 
Singodimejo and Teuku Muhammad Hasan.2 If we take 
what Effendy says to be true, then it can’t be said that 
the original compromise had been redone as unjustly 
as Anshari claims, as the new, amended compromise 
was similarly reached on a common, if less formal, 
agreement between Islamic and secular parties.
The History of Non-Muslim Presidency in 
Indonesia
The potential of the country having a non-Muslim as 
President became a very real prospect and a hot topic of 
conversation amongst the public in the 1980s when it 
was reported that Benny Moerdani, a Catholic General 
and the Indonesian Armed Forces Commander at that 
time, was aspiring to become President. At first, only a 
small number of Moerdani’s contemporaries knew of 
this aspiration. In the military, the first person to find 
out was Prabowo Subianto, President Suharto’s son-in-
law who was also a special staff member of Moerdani’s 
at the time. When Suharto himself learnt of Benny’s 
ambition, through Subianto, he initially didn’t believe 
him, but eventually changed his mind after receiving 
further confirmation from other sources. Moerdani 
was so angry at Subiyanto that he discharged him from 
Kopassus (the Army’s special forces unit) and made him 
a military district commander (Kodim) of a far-flung 
location a long way from Jakarta.
One of the first people from outside the military 
to know of this aspiration was Moerdani’s close ally, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, known simply as Gus Dur, 
who was asked specifically by Benny for his opinion 
on the matter. Moerdani’s relationship with Gus Dur 
later became the subject of controversy when Gus Dur, 
1 Endang Saifuddin, Anshari, Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 Sebua -
Konsensus Nasional Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia (1945 – 
1949), (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1997). 
2 Bahtiar, Effendy, Islam dan Negara Transformasi Pemikiran dan 
Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998).
speaking at a seminar titled “Political Development in 
Indonesia” held at Monash University in Australia, was 
asked whether a non-Muslim could become Indonesian 
President, and who he thought the most appropriate 
future leader for the country was. In response, Gus Dur 
said that according to the Indonesian Constitution, a 
non-Muslim could become President, and one of the 
most appropriate future leaders would be Moerdani. This 
answer, to a very provocative question for Indonesian 
Muslims, caused a number of different reactions. While 
some saw the response as perfectly reasonable, since, as 
Gus Dur had said, the 1945 Constitution does state 
that a non-Muslim can become President in the future, 
others were angry at Gus Dur just for canvasing the idea. 
Others claimed that the comment was evidence that 
he had formed a coalition with Benny Moerdani and 
planned to nominate him as the Indonesian President. 
Others accused him of being non-Muslim henchman.
Later on, prior to the 1993 election, in addition to 
the United Development Party (PPP), four members 
of the Indonesian Muslim Scholars Association 
(ICMI) —Ismail Sunny, Nurcholish Madjid, Sri 
Edi Swasono, and Muslimin Nasution—frequently 
condemned Gus Dur’s support of Moerdani’s to replace 
Soeharto as President. During a private discussion 
with a US diplomat, when these four were asked for 
their opinion on the prospect of Moerdani becoming 
the next President, Nurcholish said that even though 
Gus Dur—a prominent Muslim—seemed to approve 
his candidacy, he still thought that Muslims would 
not accept it. Nurcholish’s opinion on this matter was 
gotten hold of by the media when Sunny leaked it to 
them soon after. 
As usual, in facing these reports Gus Dur was very 
calm in front of the media. According to Gus Dur, certain 
people, including Lukman Harun of Muhammadiyah, 
who had contributed to the gossip about his support 
for Moerdani, had simply misunderstood him. His 
statement in Australia about Benny did not necessarily 
mean that he wanted him to supplant Suharto as 
President. Rather, it was merely meant to educate an 
Australian audience about Indonesian politics, and 
that constitutionally speaking Moerdani, as a non-
Muslim, had equal rights to the Presidency as a Muslim. 
Besides, the fact that the pair were already colleagues 
meant that his support for Moerdani was perfectly 
understandable.
However, Gus Dur realized that most Muslim 
leaders, particularly modernists, didn’t really trust 
Moerdani. The main reason for this was due to the 
1984 Tanjung Priok Incident, in which, at Moerdani’s 
order, Islamic protesters were killed in a demonstration 
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in Jakarta. Nevertheless, because Gus Dur felt that if he 
wasn’t loyal to Moerdani he might lose his job as leader 
of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), he remained supportive 
of him, even though secretly Gus Dur didn’t approve 
of his friend’s violent streak. In fact, for Gus Dur, his 
relationship with Benny was reportedly more one 
of mutual benefit than one of friendship. Gus Dur’s 
relationship with Moerdani meant that whenever he 
was detained by the police—eight times in total when 
he was campaigning for PPP—Moerdani immediately 
released him. Plus, his relationship with Moerdani 
attracted the attention of the elite, meaning greater 
exposure for himself and the NU, and enabled him to 
gain access to the world of the ruling regime. In a society 
tightly controlled by the military, even a little support 
from one of the military’s high ranking officials was not 
only useful, but also necessary if one wanted to play 
an important part in Indonesian politics. Meanwhile, 
Moerdani’s relationship with Gus Dur, with both men 
similarly concerned about the threat militant Islam 
presented to a harmonious Indonesia, was viewed as 
serving as a gateway to the world of politics.
Some also viewed Gus Dur’s statement in Australia 
as being aimed at upsetting the relationship between 
Suharto and the military, which was, at that time, 
under Moerdani’s command. Later on, it was revealed 
that the relationship between Suharto and the military 
was starting to sour, with Moerdani secretly starting 
to oppose Soeharto. When Soeharto realized that 
the military’s support for him was diminishing, he 
responded with a move to balance military power by 
changing his approach in dealing with conservative 
Muslims. This was illustrated most categorically in 
1990 when the Indonesian Association of Muslim 
Intellectuals (ICMI) was set up.  Several months before 
the ICMI’s official inception, Suharto clearly stated his 
wish to sponsor it. The organization has had a close 
association with Golkar, Suharto’s party, ever since. In 
addition to substantial financial support from Suharto, 
he also appointed senior minister B.J. Habibie as an 
official chairman.
Conservative Islamic scholars were delighted about 
Soeharto’s support for ICMI, especially those who had 
been involved in starting ICMI who had previously been 
active in Masyumi, a major Islamic Political Party in 
Indonesia, but whose efforts to try to revive their party 
had previously been rejected by Suharto. Suddenly, in 
feeling as though they had gone from the state’s enemy 
to its friend, it finally felt like their prayers had been 
answered.
Through his support of ICMI, Suharto succeeded 
in making militant Muslims go from criticizing him 
to cooperating with him. It was also with the help of 
the ICMI that he garnered the support of almost half 
the country’s Muslims, which contributed to his being 
reelected in 1993.  However, even though political 
tension had subsided after the election, Suharto still 
considered that Gus Dur threatened to undermine 
his relationship with the military, which was cause for 
concern as he believed the military had the potential 
to topple him from the Presidency. With Suharto 
already having demoted Moerdani from Armed Forces 
Commander to Defense Minister in 1988—replacing 
him with Try Sutrisno—before his term had ended, in 
1993 he was booted from cabinet altogether, confirming 
in no uncertain terms Suharto’s feelings towards him.
In 1998, early on in the reform era, the press reignited 
the issue of non-Muslim Presidency with the circulation 
of a photograph picturing Megawati devotedly engaged 
in Hindu ritual. A.M. Saefuddin, the then Minister of 
Food and Horticulture, utilised this image to suggest 
that since Megawati was presumably Hindu, given 
Indonesia’s Muslim majority population he would be a 
better choice as President. Afterwards, Saefuddin said in 
a press conference that he did not mean to offend non-
Muslim Indonesians, yet this did not stop the Balinese 
Hindus from being furious at him. In a demonstration 
broadcast on television, Balinese Hindus were seen 
hanging Saefuddin’s dummy, insisting he apologize and 
resign from his position.
Even though he did not resign from his position, 
Saefuddin did have to apologise to the Hindus for his 
controversial remarks, which were deemed to have 
humiliated them by downgrading them to second 
class citizens. Megawati, for her part, aimed to get her 
candidacy as Indonesian President back on track with 
what was dubbed a “political hajj pilgrimage”. Six years 
later, the issue re-emerged when, for the first time in 
modern Indonesian history, the General Chairman of 
Partai Damai Sejahtera, Ruyandi Hutasoit, a Christian, 
ran for President in the 2004 Presidential Election. 
Again, this event was met with conflicting views. 
On the one hand, Hutasoit’s supporters thought his 
candidacy was constitutionally legitimate. On the other 
hand, while resigned to that fact, those who opposed it 
argued that because Indonesia itself was predominantly 
Muslim, this forbade a non-Muslim from becoming 
President. The journalists of Sabili took the latter 
stance particularly aggressively. The front cover of the 
April 23, 2004 edition of the magazine declared “Tolak 
Presiden Salib”— “Reject Christian President”,  a none-
too-subtle reference to Hutasoit.
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Scholarship about Non-Muslim Presidency in 
Indonesia
The requirement which states that the Indonesian 
President must be Muslim was removed from the 
Constitution on August 18, 1945, as mentioned earlier. 
Nevertheless, there is still difference of opinion amongst 
political leaders as to whether or not a non-Muslim 
Indonesian can become President. Amongst those who 
oppose non-Muslims from becoming President, there 
are at least three reasons that underpin this stance. The 
first reason, as advocated by Anshari and Ali Yafie, is 
that the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta) states that the 
Indonesian President must be Muslim, and since the 
1945 Constitution is inspired by the Jakarta Charter, so 
it follows that this is a legitimate basis for the President 
having to be Muslim.3
The second reason, as put forth by Prof. Ibrahim 
Hosen, is that the Republic of Indonesia actually 
belongs to an Islamic State (Darul Islam), due to its 
predominantly Muslim population. In an Islamic 
State (Darul Islam), Hosem argues that a waliyyul 
amri (President) and his Vice must be good Muslims. 
Furthermore, Hosen argues that in addition to political 
affairs the head of state is also responsible for the 
management of religious and spiritual matters, so in 
order to carry out both these duties, unless he is Muslim 
he is unqualified for the role. Hosen says that to support 
the candidacy of non-Muslims as waliyyul amri is in fact 
to disobey the teachings of their religion. He accuses 
Islamic leaders who do take this stance of probably 
only doing so in order to position themselves for a shot 
at ministerial cabinet or a similar role, and that they 
shouldn’t be considered as ulamas (Islamic Scholars) by 
the general public, but if they are to be then they should 
only be considered as ulama sû’ (confused ulemas).
Hosen’s view is in line with and influenced by the 
concept that the state should be based on classical 
Islamic ideology, rather than any other ideology, such as 
nationalism. But today, according to Munawir Sjadzali, 
this classical thinking is no longer relevant, as the 
state is mostly sustained by national principles rather 
than religious ones.4 According to Robert N. Bellah, 
if there is an appropriate Islamic model for a nation 
state today it is the Medina Charter, the social-political 
order established by Prophet Muhammad in Medina 
and developed by al-Khulafa al-Rasyidun. Munawir 
calls on Muslims in this current contemporary era to 
subscribe to this charter, as it guarantees equal rights and 
3 Interview with Ali Yafie, Jakarta, March 4,  2004. 
4 Munawir, Sjadzali, “Kembali ke Piagam Madinah”, in Politik Demi 
Tuhan: Nasionalisme Religius di Indonesia, (Bandung : Pustaka Hidayah, 
1999).
obligation between the citizens and the state regardless 
of religion.
The third reason, expressed by Didin Hafidhuddin, 
is that it is convention that the Indonesian President 
is Muslim.5 Hafidudhin also argues that irrespective of 
one’s normative stance, it is unlikely that a non-Muslim 
could become President for theological, sociological 
and psychological reasons. Theologically, Indonesian 
Muslims are obliged to choose, and have chosen Islamic 
leaders throughout the country’s history. Sociologically 
and psychologically, Hafidhuddin says since most 
Indonesians are Muslim, and most Muslims assume 
that a Muslim leader would respond to their aspirations 
more favorably, a leader of any other religion simply 
wouldn’t be able to get the numbers required to become 
elected. As long as Indonesian Muslims act in strict 
accordance to their faith, Hafidhuddin asserts, this will 
hold true. Said Aqiel Siradj agrees with this, but unlike 
Hafidudhin thinks that just because it is unlikely that 
non-Muslim will become President, doesn’t mean that 
he or she shouldn’t be able to become President6.
Those in favor of non-Muslims being able to 
become President are non-Muslim scholars like 
J.T.C. Simorangkir (Protestant) and B. Mang Rey Say 
(Catholic) and some Muslims like Hasyim Muzadi, 
Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif and Gus Dur. They point to 
at least three main reasons as to why a non-Muslim 
should be able to become Indonesian President. The 
first reason, as drawn upon by Simorangkir and Mang 
Rey Say, is that the Jakarta Charter is not its binding 
legal source. Furthermore, Ruyandi Hutasoit adds that 
just because the Jakarta Charter was mentioned again 
in the Preamble to the July 5, 1959 Presidential Decree, 
doesn’t mean that the requirement that the President 
must be Muslim was suddenly automatically revived.7 
If we accept this reasoning, then we have to accept that 
the Jakarta Charter, which at one point, though not 
anymore, said that the President had to be Muslim, 
does not effect the prevailing 1945 Constitution, even 
though there is currently nothing in there specifically 
saying that the President doesn’t have to be Muslim.
Similarly, Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif states that although 
most Indonesians are Muslim, this does not mean that 
minority groups do not have the right to be President.8 
As long as a candidate from a minority group is able 
to win a democratic Presidential election, it is possible 
for them to become President. However, if we look at 
the United States of America, where the majority of its 
5 Interview with Didin Hafidhuddin, Bogor, May 7 2005.
6 Interview with Said Aqiel Siradj, Jakarta,  May 9, 2005. 
7 Interview with Ruyandi Hutasoit, Jakarta, May 25, 2005. 
8 Interview with Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif, (Jakarta, May  17, 2005).
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population is Protestant, it has seldom seen a citizen 
from a minority religion be elected as President. An 
exception to this rule, John F. Kennedy, a Catholic who 
became President in 1960, was killed before he had 
ended his term in office in 1963. Ma’arif says that India, 
with a majority Hindu population, is the exception, 
with some Presidents from the Muslim minority. So far 
none of them have been killed in office. 
Saefuddin says that the probability of a non-Muslim 
becoming Indonesian President is about the same as that 
of a Muslim becoming US President, which, after 230 
years of democracy, has yet to happen, even though the 
US unambiguously separates church and state and the 
US constitution does not forbid Muslims or anyone of 
any other religion from becoming President. Similarly, 
in Europe, given that the majority population is not 
Muslim and is unlikely to want to vote for a Muslim, it 
is not that a Muslim is not allowed to become President 
but simply that it is unlikely that it would happen. 
Even theologically, Hasyim Muzadi notes that although 
there are some verses in the Qur’an, for example Verse 
28 of Surah Ali Imran, which forbid Muslims from 
electing a non-Muslim leader, the Qur’an has two types 
of prohibitions—absolute and non-absolute—so it is 
important to see what type of prohibition applies to 
non-Muslim leadership.9 An example of an absolute 
prohibition is to make a non-Muslim an Imam in a 
mass prayer. Meanwhile, a non-absolute prohibition is, 
among others, electing a non-Muslim President, which 
means that in some circumstances this can be a legitimate 
course of action, even in a Qur’anic framework.
The second argument as to why theoretically a non-
Muslim can become President is because Indonesia is 
not an Islamic State and in the Constitution there is 
nothing prohibiting a non-Muslim from becoming 
one. As Gus Dur points out, Article 6 clause (1) of the 
Constitution stipulates that every Indonesian citizen, 
regardless of their religion, has the same right to become 
President. While it is understandable that most of the 
time the President will be Muslim, this does not change 
the constitutional fact that there is always the possibility 
that he or she will belong to a different religion. Again, 
in the case of the US, while it is unlikely that a Muslim 
will become President, their right to this title is shared by 
every other American, whatever their ethnicity, religion 
or sex, and American Muslims welcome this fact.
However, unlike Saefuddin and Hafidhuddin, Gus 
Dur predicts that a non-Muslim Indonesian President 
is not outside the realm of possibility in the future. 
Ruyandi Hutasoit, Theo L Sambuaga, and Muchtar 
9 Interview with Hasyim Muzadi, Jakarta, May 9, 2005.
Pakpahan agree. Hutasoit, for instance, says that a time 
will come when this happens in Indonesia, as it has in 
both the recent past and the distant past. The recent 
Christian Presidency in Nigeria, and the example of 
the Prophet Yusuf in Egypt, a non-Egyptian native and 
from a minority group, succeeding the King Pharaoh 
as the country’s ruler, shows that nothing is impossible 
with God’s permission. 
The third reason, in rebuttal of that of the opposing 
group, is that it is not true that all Indonesians believe 
that Muslim Presidency is conventional, or that even if 
this were true it should determine whether the President 
should be anything other than Muslim. The fact that 
Ruyandi Hutasoit, a Christian from Batak ethnic group, 
was nominated as the PDS Presidential candidate for 
the 2004 Presidential election, runs counter to the 
convention argument. PDS Secretary General Denny 
Tewu asserted at the time that in nominating Mr. 
Ruyandi, the view that the Indonesian President must 
be Muslim and Javanese had sought to be eliminated 
and replaced with the view that the President should 
simply be the best and most capable person for the 
job. At the very least, this view indicates the faith that 
contemporary Indonesians, Muslim or otherwise, feel 
the same way.
Closing Remarks
So which view is correct? Should a non-Muslim be 
able to become President or not? Constitutionally, it is 
clear that members of other religious groups—Hindus, 
Buddhists, Christians, Catholics, and even members of 
communities with no formally recognized religion—are 
just as entitled to the Presidency as Muslims, despite 
the latter representing the majority of the population. 
Although Muslim people may feel obliged to reject any 
non-Muslim leader, the laws of the state concerning this 
matter, to which all Indonesians abide, unlike Islamic 
law to which only Muslims are obliged to abide, do not 
equate to those of any one religion, which in Indonesia 
Islam is but one of many. Since the view that prohibits 
non-Muslims from becoming President has not been 
approved through the legal corridor, it is therefore not 
legally binding. Neither the 1945 Constitution nor 
Law on Presidential and Vice Presidential Election has 
a single article which stipulates that the President must 
be Muslim. The exclusion of the legal requirement 
that says that the President must be a Muslim is in 
Article 6 clause (1) of 1945 Constitution and Article 
5 of Presidential and Vice Presidential Election (Law 
No.42/2008). As long as this holds, the principle of 
“istishhâb”—which in Islamic law study (ushûl fiqh) 
means a law that is valid until a new law supplants 
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it—applies. To deny the legitimacy of the legal corridor 
and treat faith as grounds for rejecting a non-Muslim 
President is not only a violation of the rights of all non-
Muslim Indonesian citizens, but in fact to also deny 
istishhâb itself. [] 
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